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NOTES AND COMMENTS

If, in fact, there is present a situation so fraught with the possibility
of fraud or unfairness that the statutory provisions of the N. I. L. are
not adequate, then it seems that legislation is the only sound solution.
Nothing but uncertainty can arise out of an encroachment upon these
statutory provisions by judicial decisions. Undoubtedly this situation
presents a ripe opportunity for collusion between unscrupulous finance
companies and dealers to take unfair advantage of the buyer.' 7 Clearly
in some cases the finance company has actually participated in the transaction to such an extent that it cannot be a holder in due course within
the statutory provisions. But in other cases there is no evidence of such
direct participation in the transaction by the finance company as would
charge it with "actual notice" or bad faith as required by the N. I. L.
In the absence of additional legislation, it is submitted that innocent
finance companies that come within the definition of a holder in due
course under the existing statutes, should not be deprived of that position because of a tendency of the courts to "catalogue" them in the same
class with unscrupulous companies by the indiscriminate or deliberate
use of such terms as "close connection." Such a result seems especially
unreasonable in the light of the fact that a certain amount of participation by the finance company, as pointed out earlier, is essential in order
to avoid unreasonable delay or risks.' 8
BOBBY G. BYRD.

State Tort Claims Act-Construction
In three recent cases' the question whether the North Carolina Tort
Claims Act 2 should be strictly or liberally construed has been presented
to the court. In Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education,3 the issue was
" In Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp., 87 Ohio 311, 94 N. E. 2d 710 (1950),
the court found that the finance company engaged in a conspiracy with the dealer

to defraud the buyer. But for something of a reversal of the usual situation see

Mutual Finance Corp. v. Dickinson, 123 N. J. L. 62, 7 A. 2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
and Motor Finance Corp. v. Huntsberger, 116 Ohio St. 317, 156 N. E. 111 (1927),
where the courts indicated that if any collusion existed, it was between the purchaser and the dealer.
"8Another problem which frequently arises is whether the simultaneous execution of the note with a conditional sales contract destroys its negotiability. According to the weight of authority it does not. 'Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950); Mutual Finance
Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger,
268 Wis. 143, 66 N. W. 2d 657 (1954), rehearing denied, 67 N. W. 2d 873
(1955) ; 2 WILLISTON, SALEs § 332, p. 291 (Rev. ed. 1948). But some cases have
held that negotiability is destroyed. Note, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 244 (1949).
'Floyd v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 241 N. C. 461, 85
S. E. 2d 703 (1955) ; Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329,
85 S. E. 2d 386 (1955) ; Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education, 238 N. C. 24, 76
S. E. 2d 553 (1953).
2 N. C. GEx. STAT. § 143-291 et seq., as amended in 1953.
'238 N. C. 24, 76 S. E. 2d 553 (1953). Discussed in note, 32 N. C. L. REv.
242 (1954), as to subrogation.
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whether the right of subrogation existed under the act. In saying that
the right existed, Justice Parker stated that most statutes waiving a
government's immunity had been strictly construed, but that the current trend of legislative policy and judicial thought is away from such
4
construction. In Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, a prisoner
detained at a state penal institution and negligently operating a hospital
truck was held not to be an employee within the meaning of the Tort
Claims Act. Justice Bobbitt, in a concurring opinion, argued that, if
immunity is to be waived beyond the provisions of the Act as strictly
construed, this is a matter for the General Assembly to decide. Then in
Floyd v. State Highway and Public Works Commission,5 plaintiff
claimed a maintenance supervisor of the State Highway and Public
Works Commission was negligent in failing to see that his instructions
were carried out with respect to the use of larger tile for a fill, after he
had notice that the fill had washed out once before. The fill again
washed out and plaintiff's intestate was killed when he drove his car
into the washout. In denying recovery, Justice Higgins, writing the
majority opinion, stated that since the Act is in derogation of sovereign
immunity, the sounder view is that it should be strictly construed.
Justice Parker dissented in the latter two cases, arguing against a strict
construction.
In discussing the construction of a statute waiving the immunity of a
state, certain established principles should be recalled. The North Carolina court has repeatedy proclaimed that the state cannot be sued without
its consent ;6 this immunity is absolute and unqualified. 7 Furthermore,
an agency of the state may be sued only when and as authorized by
statute, s and even if authority to use the agency is given, it does not
extend to actions for torts unless expressly provided. 9 The remedy
given to injured individuals before the State Tort Claims Act was a right
4241 N. C. 329, 85 S. E. 2d 386 (1955).
1;241 N. C. 461, 85 S. E. 2d 703 (1955).

6 This is apparently based on the construction given the Eleventh Amendment

to the Constitution of the United States in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890).
See also: Smith v. Hefner, 235 N. C. 1, 68 S. E. 2d 783 (1951) ; Dalton v. State
Highway and Public Works Commission, 223 N. C. 406, 27 S. E. 2d 1 (1943);
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Powell, 217 N. C. 495, 8 S. E. 2d 619 (1940).
" Schloss v. State Highway and Public Works Commission, 230 N; C. 489, 53
S. E. 2d 517 (1949); Dalton v. State Highway and Public Works Commission,
223 N. C. 406, 27 S. E. 2d 1 (1943).
8 Burgin v. Smith, 151 N. C. 561, 66 S. E. 607 (1909) ; Moody v. State Prison,
128 N. C. 12, 38 S. E. 131 (1901).
' "It was a hardship on plaintiff, but no legal wrong of the defendant. It
goes without saying that State authorities should exercise due care in the performance of governmental functions, but for the failure, in cases of this nature, no
liability attaches." Reeves v. Asheville Construction Co., 194 N. C. 817, 818, 140
S. E. 733, 734 (1927). See also: Carpenter v. Atlanta and Charlotte Air Line Ry.
Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922); Jones v. Commissioners of Franklin
County, 130 N. C. 451, 42 S. E. 144 (1902).
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of action against the employees of the agency,' 0 or against officials of the
state in limited cases,". or on appeal to the legislature for an appropria2

tion.1

Most of the states which have passed acts allowing the state or its
agencies to be sued have construed such acts strictly.' 3 In at least
one case a constitutional provision allowing suits against the state has
been strictly construed.' 4 The reasons given for such construction are:
(1) since the acts are in derogation of common law, or in derogation of
sovereignty, it is elemental that they are to be strictly construed ;i5 (2)
actions against the state would impair respect for sovereignty and make
inroads upon the public revenue;"6 (3) there can be no legal rights
against the authority that makes the law upon which such rights depend ;17 (4) suits against the state would subject it to manifold, indefinite, and interminable liability;18 and (5) there would be crippling'
interferences with government if the acts were liberally construed.' 9
In those states in which statutes authorizing suits against the state
have been liberally construed, this result usually is obtained because such
statutes have been passed in furtherance of constitutional provisions. 20
Another reason given is that such statutes are mererly remedial and do
2
not create a new right of action. '
'It is gradually being recognized that states, through their officers and
agents, can and do commit tortious acts. 22 States are making an un10 Miller v. Jones, 224 N. C. 783, 32 S. E. 2d 594 (1945) ; Carpenter v. Atlanta
and Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 184 N. C. 400, 114 S. E. 693 (1922).
"Wilkins v. Burton, 220 N. C. 13, 16 S. E. 2d 406 (1941); Old Fort v.

Harmon, 219 N. C. 241, 13 S.E. 2d 423 (1941).

See note, 23 N. C. L. REv. 270

(1945), for discussion of distinction between liability for violation of discretionary
duties and liability for violation of ministerial duties.
12 Under Article IV, Section 9 of the North Carolina Constitution,
the Su-

preme Court has original jurisdiction to hear claims against the state, but its
decisions shall be merely recommendatory. The General Assembly alone decides
whether a claim against the state is just and shall be paid. Rotan v. State, 195

N. C. 291, 141 S. E. 733 (1928).
1 For a summary by states of state tort claims acts, see Leflar and Kantrowitz,
Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).

"People

v. Birch Securities, 86 Cal.2d 703, 196 P.2d 143 (1948).

Hailey v. City of Newark, 22 N.J. 139, 36 A.2d 210 (1944).
10 Quinton v. Board of Claims, 165 Tenn. 201, 54 S.W.2d 953 (1932).
' 7 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349 (1907); Arnold v. State, 48
N. M. 596, 154 P. 2d 257 (1944).
18 State v. Dickerson, 141 Tex. 475, 174 S.W.2d 244 (1943).
10 Harrison v. Wyoming Liquor Commission, 63 Wyo. 13, 177 P.2d 397 (1947).
But in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944), it was held
that when authority to sue a sovereign is given, it is liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.
20 Construction of such statutes should not be so strict as to violate the legislative intent or reflect on dignity of the state. Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. 2d
917 (1945) ; Jackson v. State_ 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 735 (1933) ; Northwestern and Pacific Bank v. State, 18 Wash. 73, 50 Pac. 586 (1897).
'Lewis v. State, 207 La. 194, 20 So. 2d 917 (1945).
" This is generally recognized by the mere enactment of tort claims acts by the
states. But the North Carolina court as late as 1949 said, as to the State High12
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precedented expansion into many fields of activity and subjecting their
citizens to increasing risks from "defective, negligent, perverse or
erroneous administration" 23 of these activities. Along with this expansion come acts such as the North Carolina Tort Claims Act, 24 which
recognize the moral duty imposed by considerations of equity and
justice.2 5 When a state thus discards its mantle of sovereignty, it would
seem inconsistent to whittle the consent down by a strict construction. 20
"The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough
where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced." 27
Some arguments that may be advanced in favor of a liberal construction of such statutes are: (1) they are intended to relieve the state legislatures from the pressure of private claims, so that the legislatures may
devote their time to matters of public concern ;28 (2) prerogatives of
governments should yield to needs of their citizens ;29 (3) when a state
consents to be sued, it should occupy the same position as a private citizen and be entitled to no special privileges ;30 and (4) the courts should
not be concerned with the problem of financing the possible results of
suits against the state, but should leave it to the legislature to require
liability insurance. 31
Perhaps the question of strict construction because of sovereign immunity is best summed up by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in a decision in 1851 :32
"A notion which might have been plausibly challenged, if the
question was an open one in the courts of this country, as a sickly
way and Public Works Commission: "It is as powerless to exceed its authority
as is a robot to act beyond the limitations imposed by its own mechanism. It can
commit no actionable wrong." Schloss v. State Highway and Public Works
Commission, 230 N.C. 489, 53 S.E.2d 517 (1949).
" Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25).
Professor Borchard referred to the "unexampled expansion of the police power in
the United States." What about expansion from 1924 to 1955? See also Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27)
Anderson, Claims Against States, 7 VAND. L. REV. 234 (1954).
24 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 et seq., as amended in 1953.
25 Jackson v. State, 261 N. Y. 134, 184 N. E. 735 (1933).
2 United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 338 U. S.366 (1949), citing
Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 153 N. E. 28 (1926).
See also Seavey, "Liberal Construction" and the Tort Liability of the Federal
Government, 67 HAgv.L. Rxv. 994 (1954).
' Cardozo, J., in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140,
147, 153 N. E. 28, 29 (1926).
" See dissents by Parker, J., in Alliance Co. v. State Hospital, 241 N. C. 329,
334, 85 S. E. 2d 386, 390 (1955), and in Floyd v. State Highway and Public
Works Commission, 241 N. C. 461, 467, 85 S.E. 2d 703, 707 (1955).
21 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951).
20 State v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 190 S.W. 2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
"See Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv.
1363 (1954), for a discussion of this possibility.
" State v. Curran, 12 Ark. 321, 345 (1851).
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exotic in American soil, where government is not prescribed to
the people by a superior power, but is merely the organ of their
own sovereignty and the creation of laws enacted by themselves,
and which derive all their obligatory force from the mutual consent of those who are to render them obedience.
"The right of a citizen to sue a state, then is not derogatory
to common right, or subversive of the true principles of the common law, but is clearly in harmony with both. .. ."
North Carolina has consistently recognized that claims against the
34

33
state not only will be made, but that they should be compensated.

In saying that the State Tort Claims Act should be strictly construed,
it is submitted that the supreme court is- following an out of date doctrine of governmental immunity, and is refusing to recognize the apparent legislative intent in passing such an act.
RICHARD

0.

GAMrrLE.

Statutes-Determination of Moment at Which Newly Enacted Statute
Attains Force of Law
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently refused to apply to a
tax statute the general rule that a day is regarded in the law as an
indivisible unit of time which begins with its first moment, and thus, a
statute is ordinarily deemed to take effect from the beginning of the day
on which it is enacted.- Decedent died at 11:55 a.m. on the morning
of 21 December, 1951. On the same day, the governor signed a bill
which increased the collateral inheritance tax rate from 10 per cent to
15 per cent, and which was to become effective immediately upon its final
enactment. There was no evidence as to the exact time of day when
the governor signed the bill, but the Commonwealth, relying on the general rule, assumed the statute to have been operative from the firsf
moment of the day of its enactment, and therefore in effect at decedent's
death. The court held that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that
the new law was actually in effect at the time of decedent's death, and
that the lower court's verdict for a 10 per cent taxation was proper.
It added that the general rule relied on by the Commonwealth was a
legal fiction, and would be disregarded whenever its application would
unjustly impair personal or property rights. In such cases, the court
said that it would take cognizance of the actual hour or time of the
passage of the statute.
"' N. C. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 9: "The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear claims against the State. .. ."
" Rotan v. State, 195 N. C. 291, 141 S. E. 733 (1928).
In re Grant's Estate, 377 Pa. 264, 105 A.2d 80 (1954).

